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Title: A Lightweight Authentication Mechanism for M2M Communications in Industrial IoT Environment
Authors: Esfahani, A. 
Mantas, G. 
Matischek, R. 
Saghezchi, F. 
Bicaku, Ani 
Maksuti, Silia 
Tauber, Markus 
Schmittner, Ch. 
Bastos, J. 
Issue Date: 2019
Source: In: IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 6(1), 288 - 296
Project: SemI40 
Journal: IEEE Internet of Things Journal 
Abstract: In the emerging industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) era, machine-to-machine (M2M) communication technology is considered as a key underlying technology for building IIoT environments, where devices (e.g., sensors, actuators, and gateways) are enabled to exchange information with each other in an autonomous way without human intervention. However, most of the existing M2M protocols that can be also used in the IIoT domain provide security mechanisms based on asymmetric cryptography resulting in high computational cost. As a consequence, the resource-constrained IoT devices are not able to support them appropriately and thus, many security issues arise for the IIoT environment. Therefore, lightweight security mechanisms are required for M2M communications in IIoT in order to reach its full potential. As a step toward this direction, in this paper, we propose a lightweight authentication mechanism, based only on hash and XOR operations, for M2M communications in IIoT environment. The proposed mechanism is characterized by low computational cost, communication, and storage overhead, while achieving mutual authentication, session key agreement, device's identity confidentiality, and resistance against the following attacks: replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, impersonation attack, and modification attack.
ISSN: 2327-4662
DOI: 10.1109/JIOT.2017.2737630
Rights: info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Appears in Collections:Informationstechnologie und Informationsmanagement

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